India, US press Nepal King to step down

INDIAN AMBASSADOR: SUMMIT AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY TO 

PRESSURE KING 

REF: KATHMANDU 473 

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, reasons 1.4 (b/d). 

Summary 

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¶1.  (S/NF) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee believes it important 

that we show the King and the people of Nepal that we remain 

closely lashed up with respect to handling the situation 

here.  In a February 27 conversation, Mukherjee suggested 

that it would be particularly useful if the President and 

Prime Minister Singh discussed Nepal during their upcoming 

conversations and pointed out that fact publicly.  Mukherjee 

agreed that pressure was building on King Gyanendra and hoped 

that staying the course and encouraging peaceful activities 

by the parties would lead to positive change; he shied away 

from my suggestions that the GOI might consider options to 

significantly up the ante on the King.  Mukherjee noted that 

he had been pushing Nepal's political parties to push the 

Maoists in a peaceful direction and would urge India's 

intelligence agencies to begin giving a similarly tough 

message to the Maoists. 

Doing Good Work with the Political Parties 

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¶2.  (C) I met with Indian Ambassador Mukherjee at his request 

on February 27.  He began by pointing out that he had 

followed up on his commitment to encourage the political 

parties to press the Maoists to live up to their commitments 

regarding non-violence (ref.).  He had told the parties that 

my public comments on the subject had merely reinforced the 

long-standing principle of the parties themselves that the 

Maoists would have to prove their sincerity not just through 

lip service, but also through actions on the ground.  Some of 

the parties had pushed back at first, but all had eventually 

acknowledged the need to verify the sincerity of the Maoists. 

 I replied that I had seen articles in the press that had 

made it clear that Mukherjee had been urging the parties to 

use their contacts with the Maoists to urge moderation, and I 

thanked him for his efforts in this regard. 

Keeping Pressure on the King 

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¶3.  (C) Mukherjee readily agreed with my statement that the 

King appeared to be under increasing pressure both 

domestically and internationally.  He noted that both China 

and Japan were increasingly pressing Gyanendra to compromise 

and that the King's domestic support continued to decline. 

The military was increasingly worried about the security 

situation and the lack of progress on the political front: 

the miserable showing by the RNA during the mid-February 

ambush in Nawalparasi District suggested that morale was 

alarming and could have a negative impact on morale. 

Meanwhile, the parties hoped to mobilize increasing numbers 

of people for their peaceful demonstrations in the coming 

weeks. 

¶4.  (C) I told Ambassador Mukherjee that there was 

considerable concern in Washington that, if the King did not 

begin to reconcile with the parties soon, the situation here 

might spin out of control.  Mukherjee replied that many in 

New Delhi shared such concerns: he personally had told the 

Prime Minister during an early-February visit home that India 

needed to keep the pressure on the King, while not doing 

anything that could lead to serious advances by the Maoists. 

Mukherjee had insisted to the Prime Minister that, for now, 

the GOI had to wait and watch the situation in Nepal closely. 

 By the end of April, Mukherjee speculated, it would be 

clearer whether the mounting pressure would convince the King 

to compromise, or whether the Maoists were able to convert 

their current momentum into serious gains.  (Note:  March and 

April are, with respect to the weather, the best months for 

demonstrations in the Kathmandu Valley.  The parties have put 

in place stepped-up plans for peaceful protests during those 

E 

months, while the Maoists have announced a general strike for 

mid-March and a nationwide strike for early April.  The 

Maoists will presumably enforce their strikes with violence.) 

Less Desirable Options 

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¶5.  (S/NF) Mukherejee agreed that both our governments would 

likely have to provide emergency assistance to the Nepali 

government if the security situation deteriorated 

dramatically in the coming weeks; we also agreed, however, 

that throwing the King a lifeline to save him from his own 

obstinacy would be a difficult policy prescription to follow 

in both Washington and New Delhi and would be accepted only 

in the face of a huge and immediate threat from the Maoists. 

In that context, I asked Mukherjee again whether he thought 

there would be any support in New Delhi for having Washington 

and New Delhi (and presumably London) issue an ultimatum to 

the King:  either begin meaningful reconciliation with the 

parties immediately, or the international community would 

commence severe sanctions against his regime.  I acknowledged 

that India would have to bear the brunt of implementing the 

most effective possible sanctions:  seizing royal family 

assets, banning royal family travel, closing the border to 

trade.  Mukherjee immediately replied that New Delhi would be 

very unlikely to agree to such a proposal:  Prime Minister 

Singh had made it clear that the GOI should do nothing that 

would hurt the people of Nepal. 

Keeping the Intelligence Agencies in Line 

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¶6.  (S/NF) I reminded Ambassador Mukherjee that Washington 

was becoming discomforted by all-too-credible rumors that 

Indian intelligence agencies were squiring the top leaders of 

the Maoists around New Delhi and arranging interviews for 

them.  Mukherjee replied that he had neither the ability nor 

the desire to know exactly what the Indian intelligence 

agencies were up to.  He added, however, that he would be 

communicating to those agencies that, in whatever contacts 

they had with the Maoists, they needed to stress:  that the 

GOI would do everything necessary to prevent them from 

establishing a one-party dictatorship in Nepal; that they 

would be judged not by their statements, but by their 

actions; and that the only way they could return to the 

political mainstream in Nepal would be by foreswearing 

violence and abandoning their weapons. 

Comment 

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¶7.  (C) This was an encouraging meeting.  Mukherjee clearly 

wanted to ensure that, on the eve of the President's visit to 

New Delhi, GOI and USG policy on Nepal were as much as 

possible in synch.  I agree with him completely that the best 

means to keep productive pressure on the King is to make it 

clear that the leaders of our two countries are working 

together, and see eye-to-eye, on Nepal. (Source: Wikileaks)