Nepal Army stock of ammunition had reached crisis point in 2006, US cables

INDIAN, UK ENVOYS ON STATE OF 

ARMY, TALKS BETWEEN PARTIES, MAOISTS 

REF: A. KATHMANDU 658 

     ¶B. KATHMANDU 606 (NOTAL) 

Classified By: CDA John K. Schlosser, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 

SUMMARY 

-------- 

¶1.  (S) Visiting SCA PDAS Camp and the Ambassador alerted the 

Indian and British ambassadors in a March 9 meeting that the 

Chief of Army Staff had acknowledged that the Royal Nepalese 

Army's stocks of ammunition were so low as to have reached a 

"crisis" point.  Indian Ambassador Mukherjee maintained that 

the RNA had sufficient supplies to move ammunition around 

from one sector to another and that its senior commanders 

were using non-government procurement channels to acquire 

arms and enrich themselves in the process.  The Indian 

Ambassador disclosed that he had been in close touch with the 

political parties prior to their ongoing meeting with the 

Maoists in India, urging the parties to dictate the agenda of 

any cooperation with the Maoists.  The British and Indian 

ambassadors contended the parties' 12-point understanding 

with the Maoists had been beneficial to the parties, as the 

Maoists currently were not targeting their workers in rural 

areas. The British ambassador said the EU would discuss Nepal 

the week of March 13 and was considering a "democracy 

challenge," urging both the King and the Maoists to abandon 

pursuit of a military resolution and perhaps offering the 

prospect of additional aid to induce a return to democracy. 

The three ambassadors and Camp explored the possibility of an 

international conference on Nepal, perhaps in London. End 

Summary. 

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RNA Assessment of Ammo "Crisis" Disputed by Indian 

Ambassador... 

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¶2.  (S)  Visiting SCA PDAS Donald Camp met March 9 with 

British Ambassador Keith Bloomfield and Indian Ambassador 

Shiv Mukherjee over lunch hosted by the Ambassador.  Acting 

DCM John Schlosser (notetaker) also participated.  PDAS Camp 

and the Ambassador briefed on Camp's meetings thus far, 

including his March 8 audience with the King and subsequent 

meeting with COAS General Thapa.  The Ambassador noted that 

this was the first time Thapa had acknowledged that the RNA's 

ammunition shortage had reached a "crisis" point. Bloomfield, 

who had not been fully aware of the very low level of 

ammunition for the RNA's modern rifles and the almost 

complete lack of helicopter-fired rockets, expressed concern. 

 Mukherjee disputed that there was a "crisis."  He recognized 

that the RNA was indeed "short" on ammunition, but countered 

"they have enough to move stuff around" from one part of the 

country to another, if needed, at least for the time being. 

(N.B.  This is consistent with our information that the RNA 

could move forward-deployed ammunition around for a month or 

two to hide the fact that central stores were depleted.) 

¶3.  (S) Mukherjee acknowledged, however, that the RNA had 

very little ammunition for training purposes and that some 

units were deployed with only 8 rounds out of 35 slots in the 

magazines of their (Indian-provided) SLR rifles.  That was 

easy to see, Mukherjee added, because the SLR magazines are 

transparent.  Still, the Indian ambassador said his defense 

attache had reported that no RNA field commanders had yet 

complained about a lack of ammunition. 

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... who Alleges High-Level Corruption, Low Morale in 

RNA 

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¶4.  (C) The RNA's principal problem, Mukherjee continued, did 

not concern ammunition but rather morale, which was "very 

low."  Many units had had no leave in 18 months and, even if 

the soldiers were given leave, they could not return to their 

villages because the security situation would not permit it. 

The Ramban battalion had not been paid in 3 months, he 

alleged.  Moreover, Mukherjee asserted, corruption at senior 

levels of the RNA was high.  The line ministries of 

government were taking across-the-board cuts, recorded in the 

budget as "miscellaneous" but ostensibly for security needs 

related to the insurgency.  Senior officers were enriching 

themselves with funds set aside for procurement.  They had 

told the Chinese, Mukherjee added, to up their invoices for 

small arms by 30 percent.  (Note:  In a separate, March 11 

meeting with Charge, Mukherjee claimed that the corruption 

factor explained why the RNA leadership had, at least until 

recently, not been overly concerned about India, the UK and 

the U.S. cutting off arms shipments.  Such transfers were 

government-to-government and did not allow for price padding 

and skimming.  The RNA senior commanders, Mukherjee asserted, 

were content to acquire arms on the black or gray market, 

which was a profitable arrangement for them. End Note.) 

¶5.  (C) The Indian ambassador contended that the situation in 

the RNA was so bad, in terms of poor leadership, poor 

training and low morale, that foreign countries could provide 

five, even ten times the quantity of munitions and materiel 

than previously had been provided and the army still would 

not be able to defeat the insurgency.  (Note: Amplifying this 

point in the March 11 meeting with Charge, Ambassador 

Mukherjee said his mission was in touch with 33,000 

ex-Gurkhas retired from the Indian Army who were scattered 

around the country, and their general assessment was that 

arming the RNA in its current state of training and 

leadership was pointless.  End Note.) 

--------------------------------------------- -- 

Indians Advise Political Parties on Talks with 

Maoists 

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¶6.  (C) Turning to the political scene, PDAS Camp and the 

Ambassador discussed their meetings earlier that day with 

party leaders G.P. Koirala and (former prime minister) Sher 

Bahadur Deuba (Ref. A).  Mukherjee said he had been in close 

touch with the parties prior to their ongoing meeting with 

the Maoists in Delhi.  (Note:  Mukherjee did not admit that 

the meeting was taking place in India, but did not deny it 

either when Camp and the Ambassador spoke of it as a fact.) 

Mukherjee had urged the parties to give their representatives 

a mandate to make their own demands of the Maoists, to 

require them to meet their commitments under the 12-point 

understanding  by "testing them on the ground."  The parties 

should push, for example, for implementation of the section 

of the understanding that calls for Maoist restitution of 

citizens' property they had seized.  The parties should also 

form a shadow cabinet, Mukherjee continued, and should 

develop positions on a range of issues, thereby convincing 

the public that they have "a real program."  The important 

thing, Mukherjee said, was that the parties set the agenda 

and that the Maoists come to them, not vice versa. 

---------------------------------- 

Maoists Going Easy on the Parties? 

---------------------------------- 

¶7.  (C) Bloomfield contended that the political parties were 

getting some benefits from the 12-point understanding with 

the Maoists.  Violence against their workers in the villages 

was down and they could conduct their political activities 

more or less free of molestation. The Maoists' practice of 

extortion, however, still continued, as did their attacks on 

security forces.  Mukherjee and Bloomfield both contended 

that the Maoists were much concerned with public opinion and 

were currently being careful not to harm civilians.  The two 

ambassadors both expressed hope that the ongoing talks would 

result in, at the very least, a Maoist pledge not to disrupt 

the parties' round of non-violent protest demonstrations, 

planned to start April 8, and better, abandonment of the 

Maoists' indefinite nationwide strike (bandh) planned for 

April 3 and/or announcement of a renewed ceasefire. 

------------------------------------------ 

International Community Should Plan for 

Decommissioning, Reconstruction 

------------------------------------------ 

¶8.  (C) Bloomfield noted the enormous tasks for the 

international community that lay ahead, if there were to be a 

peaceful resolution of Nepal's crisis.  The costs of 

reconstruction would be enormous.  In addition, even during a 

ceasefire, to say nothing of a permanent settlement, the 

Maoist cadres had to eat.  Extortion and thievery were their 

only means of keeping themselves fed in the field.  The 

international community needed to plan ahead for a 

significant disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 

(DDR) effort in Nepal. Bloomfield pointed out there was 

plenty of experience in the UN and in other organizations in 

DDR elsewhere in the world.  Bloomfield and Mukherjee agreed 

that the term for disarmament used with the Maoists must be 

"decommissioning" of weapons rather than "laying down arms," 

which would be interpreted by Maoist cadres as defeat. 

Mukherjee pointed out that negotiating the terms of 

decommissioning would be difficult, and that the Nepalis 

would need plenty of outside help, as well as in monitoring 

and accounting for arms, but all present agreed this was an 

area in which the international community had ample 

experience. 

--------------------------------------------- 

EU Weighing a New Approach on Nepal; Donors 

Conference Floated 

--------------------------------------------- 

¶9.  (C) Bloomfield disclosed that the EU would meet the week 

of March 13 on Nepal, and that one proposal being examined 

was to issue an EU "challenge" in support of democracy in 

Nepal.  Such a public statement would, inter alia, urge both 

the King and the Maoists to declare a ceasefire and recognize 

the impossibility of a military solution to the country's 

problems.  The "challenge" would also offer inducements in 

the form of increased development aid following a return to 

peace and democracy.  Bloomfield mentioned the possibility of 

a gathering of concerned international parties, perhaps along 

the lines of the "Friends of Nepal" meeting held in London in 

¶2002.  The Ambassador noted there had been no follow-up to 

that meeting.  PDAS Camp added that the massive inducements 

offered several years ago by the international co-chairs in 

Sri Lanka, with pledges amounting to some USD 2 billion, had 

not yet produced the desired result in that country. That 

said, all present agreed there might be merit in exploring 

some form of donor conference aimed at fostering conditions 

for a return to democracy.  Such a conference could take 

place in two stages, with the donors meeting among themselves 

first and then with key Nepali players. Mukherjee indicated 

that India might well be willing to participate in such a 

gathering, even if it were held outside South Asia. 

Comment 

------- 

¶10.  (C)  Indian Ambassador Mukherjee and the international 

community's emphasis should be to strengthen the political 

parties' hand vis-a-vis the Maoists, and thereby build them 

up in relation to the King.  He had clearly looked into the 

RNA's ammunition shortage and heard roughly the same 

information we had. 

¶11.  (U) Both PDAS Camp and Ambassador Moriarty have cleared 

this cable. 

(From the Wikileaks)