US and India Still on Same Nepal Page

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003048 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 

TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV IN NP PTER

SUBJECT: BOUCHER AND INDIAN OFFICIALS AGREE ON NEPAL 

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4(B, D) 

¶1. (C) Summary: Having just returned from Kathmandu, 

Assistant Secretary Boucher related to MEA Joint Secretaries 

Pankaj Saran (Nepal) and S. Jaishankar (Americas) that the 

political parties intended to show progress.  The U.S. would 

wait for the civilian government to issue a formal request 

for military assistance, while an economic and political team 

would visit Nepal within the next two weeks.  Saran agreed 

with Boucher's observations, adding that the GOI wished to 

give the new government time to organize itself before 

processing a "substantial" assistance package.  He suggested 

that the Nepali Government may opt to have an outside entity 

verify the demobilization of the Maoists.  Saran emphasized 

that the Maoists' renunciation of violence and acceptance of 

democratic politics was a "non-negotiable" demand.  Boucher 

highlighted the potential difficulties of working with the 

civilian government on military issues when Prime Minister 

Koirala also holds the Defense portfolio.   End Summary. 

Civilian Politics Messy But Improving, Boucher Observes 

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¶2. (C) In a May 3 meeting with MEA Joint Secretaries S. 

Jaishankar (Americas) and Pankaj Saran (Nepal and Bhutan), 

Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher related his impressions 

from his May 1-3 visit to Kathmandu.  First, Boucher reported 

that Prime Minister G.P. Koirala was in "decent health, but 

frail."  Second, he related that the political leaders are 

"determined to take action," and feel like they should amend 

the Constitution, allow for constituent assembly and rename 

the army to respond to their constituents.  "They want to 

show progress," Boucher said, adding that they will announce 

a ceasefire and issue an invitation to the Maoists to engage 

in negotiations very soon. 

¶3. (C) The political leaders also plan on waiting for 

elections until after the Maoists disarm, Boucher stated.  He 

expected that the ceasefire and demobilization, as well as 

the setting up of government institutions, will require a 

"year or two" before they can hold elections.  While people 

have complained that the political parties have already 

started "bickering," Boucher professed that that is like 

"asking politicians not to be politicians."  He described the 

King as "quiet and humbled," but wondered how long that 

attitude would last. 

¶4. (C) Although they distrust the army, the political leaders 

do not want to disrespect the Army, and they will put the 

Army under civilian control, Boucher asserted.  In the 

meantime, the U.S. would wait to provide training, ammunition 

and supplies until it receives a request from the civilian 

authority.  Boucher reiterated that "civilians don't want to 

do anything against the army now."  The U.S. would also 

provide economic and political assistance, and planned to 

send an assistance team to Kathmandu within the next two 

weeks.  Concluding his observations, Boucher saw the Maoists 

as the biggest factor in whether the political situation 

would break down again.  "It's important that you and we 

exert maximum pressure on the Maoists to disarm -- anything 

to choke off their supplies," he stressed. 

India on the "Same Wavelength" 

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¶5. (C) Saran endorsed Boucher's impressions, remarking that 

"we seem to be on the same wavelength."  He related that the 

GOI has encouraged the political leaders to take their own 

initiative, and not define their actions by looking to the 

King.  "The actions we've seen indicate that they have the 

inner strength to set up a government that behaves as an 

executive power," he believed.  The forthcoming ceasefire 

NEW DELHI 00003048  002 OF 002 

declaration and talks with the Maoists illustrates that view, 

he said. 

¶6. (C) Regarding assistance, the GOI had initially considered 

offering an economic assistance package, but held off because 

"it wasn't appropriate right now."  Instead, Saran explained, 

the Indians would wait for the new government to send 

requirements to which they will respond.  This "sizable" 

package will help Nepal address illiquidity and revenue 

shortfall, among other matters.  Saran also endorsed 

Boucher's stance on military assistance, confirming that they 

would also wait for the new government to issue any weapons 

and training requests. 

¶7. (C) Turning to the Maoists, which he called "the most 

difficult issue for the new government," Saran stressed that 

the GOI wanted to see a "durable" solution, and waited to see 

the steps that the political leaders would take.  While the 

understandings and statements of intent were a promising 

start, Saran observed that "so much lies between these and a 

peace agreement."  The GOI considered renunciation of 

violence and commitment to a multi-party democracy as 

"non-negotiable" in their transition from insurgents to 

democratic party.  Saran noted that while the Nepalese 

government is best positioned to demobilize the Maoists, the 

political leaders may ask for an "external entity" to help 

verify the disarmament and ceasefire.  India would consider 

such a request positively, Saran asserted, noting that the 

call for international supervision was included in the 

parties' 12-point agreement with the Maoists. 

But Nepal Is Still Tenuous 

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¶8. (C) Boucher pointed out two potential problems that he 

felt could impact Nepal's reconstruction.  First, Koirala's 

position as both Prime Minister and Defense Minister, 

compounded by a lack of civilian interlocutors knowledgeable 

about military affairs, could complicate communicating about 

the army. 

¶9. (C) Asked by Boucher if India would continue sending 

political envoys, Saran called Karan Singh a "one-off," 

adding that the GOI would revert to the "existing 

institutions" to communicate.  He noted that the Prime 

Minister had invited Koirala to visit Delhi, but that his 

frail health impedes travel.  Millard requested that the GOI 

make its redlines known to the Maoists.  The GOI does not 

have direct face-to-face contacts with the Maoists, but they 

know the redlines through our public statements, Saran 

assured. 

Comment: U.S. and India Still on Same Nepal Page 

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¶10. (C) The open and constructive exchange between Boucher 

and Saran illustrate the GOI's intention to continue working 

closely with the U.S. to help the Nepal situation.  The 

frequent U.S.-India coordination has bolstered our ability to 

help rebuild Nepal's democracy and reconstruct its economy, 

while dealing with what will be a tricky Maoist drawdown. 

Continued transparency between both our governments continues 

will boost our joint efforts in Nepal. 

¶11. (U) Ambassador Boucher has cleared this cable. 

¶12. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 

(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)