Indian pundits wanted to divide and destroy Nepal's Maoists, US cable

Indian pundits wanted to divide and destroy Nepal’s Maoists

INDIAN PUNDITS PRESS FOR NEW DIRECTION IN NEPAL 

POLICY 

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1123 

     ¶B. NEW DELHI 2220 

     ¶C. NEW DELHI 1426 

Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 

¶1.  (C) Summary: Delhi-based Nepal-watchers are split in 

their diagnosis of the strength of the competing factions in 

Nepal, and on their prescriptions for an end to the country's 

political crisis.  The GOI decision to release non-lethal 

military assistance to the RNA and press reports of Indian 

contacts with the Nepalese Maoists have sparked widespread 

complaints that India has no coherent Nepal policy.  Local 

pundits and Nepal experts recommend options ranging from full 

support of the King for military operations against the 

Maoists to sanctions on Nepal to force the Palace to 

negotiate with the political parties and Maoists.  However, 

the GOI has for now continued its course between the two 

extremes, giving cautious backing to the King but pressing 

him on democracy, and seeking to avoid any daylight with the 

US.  The GOI's immediate focus is to encourage the King and 

parties to negotiate.  End Summary. 

¶2.  (C) Recent discussions with New Delhi-based Nepal experts 

reveal no consensus on the best way to resolve the impasse 

among the Palace, the parties and the Maoists in Nepal. 

However, they broadly assert that Indian policy has been 

lackluster and directionless, criticizing the apparent shifts 

of position manifested in the initial GOI condemnation of the 

"royal coup," the subsequent decision to resume non-lethal 

military assistance, and media reports of GOI contacts with 

the Maoists. 

Indian Policy Debates 

--------------------- 

¶3.  (C) The divergent views among Nepal-watchers here on the 

prospects for a compromise between the King and the parties, 

the strength of the different actors, and the willingness of 

the King to accept true democracy are mirrored by indecision 

within the GOI.  The UPA government initially staked out a 

pro-democracy position, following its identification of 

democracy promotion (refs B and C) as a key element of Indian 

foreign policy.  Since then, however, conflicting factions of 

government and society have pulled Indian policy in 

alternating directions. 

¶4.  (C) The swift GOI condemnation of the Palace's moves 

earned praise from its Left Front governing partners, who see 

ideological brethren in the Marxist and Maoist groups in 

Nepal opposing the King.  These parties, buttressed by human 

rights NGOs and democracy activists in India, see the King as 

a reactionary despot who should be opposed at all costs, and 

support the political parties as the defenders of democracy 

and human rights in Nepal.  This perspective is shared by an 

influential circle of national security hawks, including 

former Deputy NSA Satish Chandra, who sees the Nepalese 

monarchy as a doomed enterprise and argues that India should 

pave the way for a republican Nepal.  On May 31, Chandra told 

Poloff that by appearing to back the King, India and the US 

were picking the losing side, as the monarchy was an 

"anachronism" that would eventually disappear.  Siding with 

the King now would cause the US and India to lose the 

opportunity to influence the course of events in 

post-monarchy Nepal. 

¶5.  (C) In contrast, most of the Indian security 

establishment sees the Nepalese Maoists as actual or 

potential collaborators with India's naxalite insurgents, and 

Hindutdva-based political parties proclaim an affinity to the 

world's only Hindu monarch.  These factions have emphasized 

India's historically close relations with the Nepalese 

monarchy and the danger of the Nepalese Maoists forming a 

"revolutionary zone" from Nepal through central India to 

argue for backing the monarchy to the hilt.  This internal 

and external pressure has convinced the GOI to begrudgingly 

accept the need to deal with the King, particularly in 

security assistance to repel the Maoists.  Squeezed between 

these extremes is the Foreign Ministry, which shares our twin 

objectives (no Maoist victory and return to democracy), 

values the policy partnership with the US, and is trying to 

navigate between competing Indian interest groups. 

Support the King Now, But Later... 

---------------------------------- 

¶6.  (C) Former Ambassador to Nepal KV Rajan reflected broader 

sentiment among many Nepal experts when he commented to 

Poloff recently that GOI policy toward the King has been 

"backwards."  Instead of cutting off military supplies and 

demanding democracy, the present requirement is for stronger 

support for the King against the Maoists, he argued. 

Conversely, the GOI's constant reiteration that 

constitutional monarchy is one of the "twin pillars" of 

government in Nepal in the future is also misguided: the GOI 

should back the King now but be ready to "help him depart the 

scene" once the present crisis is over.  In contrast, he 

said, the USG approach better recognized the real threat 

posed by the Maoists. 

¶7.  (C) Rajan outlined the elements of his ideal path for 

Nepal's future (which he admitted was optimistic): 

    1  -- Strong military action to take the fight to the Maoists; 

    2 -- Split in the Maoist leadership and subsequent faltering of the insurgency; 

    3  -- New leadership in the political parties with better credibility and stronger commitment to good governance; 

    4-- The King's realization that he cannot hold back demands for democratic reform forever. 

¶8.  (C) With these steps, he argued, revitalized political 

parties will gradually win concessions from the Palace on 

democratic reforms.  Rajan felt that with this view of 

Nepal's future, the time was ripe for informal consultations 

with Nepalese elites on the structure of a future democratic 

government in Nepal. 

King as Usurper 

--------------- 

¶9.  (C) Dissenting from this optimism, MG (ret) Ashok Mehta 

and Lt Gen (ret) Dipanker Banerjee recently gave more gloomy 

assessments of Nepal's future.  Mehta told Poloff on May 20 

that his contacts in Kathmandu have heard rumors that the 

King was planning to appoint Surya Bada Thapa as a new Prime 

Minister, but that Thapa had declined to accept the post 

without guarantees of freedom of action in his office.  The 

King's unwillingness to grant this assurance was indicative 

of his determination to keep all power, Mehta said.  In a May 

24 meeting, Banerjee agreed that the King fundamentally 

opposed democracy or infringements on his power, and that all 

of his moves since February 1 have only been "tactics" aimed 

at preserving his governing role. 

¶10.  (C) Banerjee also dismissed the willingness of the 

current party leaders to compromise with the King.  They will 

not change their character "even if they realize that they're 

playing into the Palace's hands," he said.  What has changed 

in the past month, he stated, was India's willingness to 

accommodate the intransigent positions of the King and the 

parties.  The GOI wants democracy, but it wants law and order 

even more, and is willing to settle for minimal guarantees of 

essential freedoms.  However, this gives the King an 

opportunity to "play at granting freedoms" while not giving 

in on any restoration of democratic government, Banerjee 

warned. 

¶11.  (C) Rajan noted that the King "has a point" when 

complaining about the parties' corruption, and the parties 

lack credibility in Nepal as a result.  It is therefore 

incumbent on India to "support a new generation" of party 

leaders, Rajan said, adding that as they displace the current 

leaders, the King will have no excuse for not engaging the 

parties on political reforms.  Rajan was optimistic that if 

the King is able to beat back the existential threat from the 

insurgency he will feel more secure, and thus more open to 

talk of democracy.  Even if he was not so inclined, Rajan 

added, once the immediate danger of a Maoist takeover has 

faded, the pressure for democratic reform would be 

overwhelming, and India would then be free to apply pressure 

to the King to accept the change. 

Maoist Strength? 

---------------- 

¶12.  (C) Rajan argued that India needs give the King more 

leeway to make progress against the Maoists.  Aggressive 

military action combined with Maoist disarray following the 

public split between leaders Prachanda and Bhattarai could 

dismantle the Maoist insurgency as a threat to Nepal's 

government.  Rajan asserted that the King, if he had not 

caused it, was working to exacerbate the internal strife in 

the insurgency through Maoist agents "on his payroll."  Under 

no circumstances, argued Rajan, should the Maoists be given 

quarter, unless as individuals they renounce the movement. 

He strongly condemned proposals to include the Maoists in a 

democratic government, and urged the GOI and USG to help the 

King pressure the Maoists militarily as a way of persuading 

individuals to give up the insurgency. 

¶13.  (SBU) In contrast, Mehta dismissed the notion that the 

split in the Maoist leadership had undermined their 

capabilities.  He noted that the movement had survived thus 

far without major dissension and internal struggles, and 

predicted that Prachanda's personal following was sufficient 

to guarantee a cohesive party in the near future, despite the 

disagreements with Bhattarai. 

¶14.  (C) Although Mehta and Banerjee agreed that the Maoists 

were unable to pose a military threat to the RNA, they warned 

that the RNA could be weakened by political events and Maoist 

tactics.  Mehta speculated that in the current impasse 

between the parties and the King, the parties will engage in 

escalating protests, and that the King will be forced to 

deploy an increasing number of RNA troops in the Kathmandu 

valley to quell political agitation.  This reduction in the 

available troop strength could lead to Maoist victories 

outside of Kathmandu.  Mehta stated that the Maoists were 

intimidating RNA soldiers' families, demanding that the 

soldier quit or face reprisals.  In the face of the extortion 

and threats, and forced to fight their own countrymen, the 

RNA was losing 200 soldiers each month, Mehta asserted.  He 

worried that Maoist pressure tactics, if continued, could 

convince entire RNA units to desert, undermining morale 

throughout the army. 

GOI Position on Maoists Questioned 

---------------------------------- 

¶15.  (SBU) Media reports that Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai 

had met Communist Party of India (Marxist) general secretary 

Prakash Karat under the auspices of Indian intelligence 

services in late May stoked a new round of public debates in 

New Delhi.  While the Nepalese Palace and its Indian 

supporters have condemned any GOI involvement as a betrayal 

of India's decision to support the King against the Maoists, 

other commentators see engagement with the Maoists as a 

positive step.  Mehta remarked that he has long encouraged 

his GOI contacts to maintain a liaison to the Maoists, to 

hold open a pathway for them to join in a political process 

after renouncing violence.  Going farther, a May 27 Times of 

India editorial called on the GOI to encourage the Maoists to 

participate in a democracy in Nepal, arguing that Nepalese 

"democracy will cure Maoism" even as Indian democracy has 

drawn parties with revolutionary rhetoric into the political 

mainstream.  Jawaharlal Nehru University Professor of South 

Asian Studies SD Muni likewise applauded this outreach to the 

Maoists, welcoming it as a restoration of balance in India's 

approach to the Nepal issue. 

¶16.  (SBU) However, the revelation of a GOI role in 

chaperoning a wanted Maoist around New Delhi also elicited 

criticism that government branches are working at cross 

purposes.  In an effort to end the controversy, the MEA 

spokesman stated on May 26 that the GOI still considers the 

Maoists as a terrorist organization, but did not explicitly 

repudiate the possibility that Bhattarai had visited New 

Delhi.  On May 31, Muni told guests at a lunch for a visiting 

HIRC staff member that the apparent shifts of policy on 

military assistance for the RNA and the Bhattarai visit to 

New Delhi showed that the collaboration among the US, UK and 

India was "in tatters."  (Note: Muni's disparagement of US 

policy was influenced in part by a mistaken media report of 

Ambassador Moriarty's remarks in Kathmandu as described in 

ref A.  End note.) 

GOI on Political Solution 

------------------------- 

¶17.  (C) Under Secretary (Nepal) Manu Mahawar repeated MEA's 

condemnation of the Maoists to Poloff on May 31, but agreed 

that ultimately the insurgency must be resolved politically, 

as the RNA does not have the capacity to force a military 

defeat on the Maoists.  Mahawar said that the GOI is urging 

the parties to unite and engage the King in negotiations for 

a compromise on democratic government, and hopes that the 

announcement of non-lethal military supplies to the RNA would 

be an incentive for the Palace.  However, he admitted that 

India had not yet seen the steps toward democracy that the 

King had promised to PM Manmohan Singh in Jakarta in April. 

¶18.  (C) Mahawar reviewed the GOI's desired roadmap for a 

reconciliation between the Palace and political parties, 

leading to a joint approach to talks with the Maoists. 

Indian efforts were now aimed at encouraging the King and 

parties to come together, Mahawar said.  He added that the 

King and the parties have separate contacts with the Maoists, 

but that no mediation among the groups would be possible 

until the Maoists renounce violence and the fundamental power 

struggle between the King and parties was resolved.  The King 

was unwilling to part with power, but he "can't continue" on 

this path indefinitely, observed Mahawar, as the Nepalese 

economy suffers from uncertainty, strikes and blockades, and 

donors and businesses leave Nepal. 

Political Options 

----------------- 

¶19.  (C) Ambassador Rajan suggested that the US, India and 

the UK, along with providing more support to the King to 

suppress the Maoist insurgency, should create a "Tier 2" 

contact group to begin formulating plans for the future of 

Nepal.  As governments could be constrained politically in 

making public proposals, Rajan suggested a non-governmental 

group that could talk to the "twenty or thirty people in 

Nepal who count" to start formulating proposals for the role 

of the monarchy in a future government.  This must be done in 

a low-key way to influence the right people, but not make the 

King feel insecure, he stressed. 

¶20.  (C) In contrast, Gen. Mehta believed that strong 

pressure from the US, UK and India could persuade the King in 

the near future to accept a political compromise with the 

parties, leading to a national government that the Maoists 

would accept as a negotiating partner, eventually bringing 

the Maoists into the political system as a peaceful movement. 

 In order to achieve this, our three governments should agree 

at the Foreign Minister level to demand that the King 

reinstate a democratic government or face sanctions, and be 

ready to follow through on the threat.  Former DNSA Chandra 

commented that the Palace was vulnerable to an Indian 

blockade of fuel supplies, and suggested that India use this 

lever to force the King to negotiate with both the parties 

and the Maoists. 

Comment 

------- 

¶21.  (C) As the GOI recalibrates its approach to the 

monarchy, the political parties and the Maoists, the need for 

coordination between the US and India is even more urgent. 

It works to our advantage that the GOI continues to place a 

very high priority on close coordination with the US, and the 

avoidance of any perceived daylight between Washington and 

New Delhi.  The apparent espousal of divergent policies by 

different branches of the GOI undermines both the Indian 

message to the political entities in Nepal, and the unified 

front portrayed by the US, UK and India.  While Nepal 

watchers here disagree on the optimal policy, they all agree 

that a more clearly articulated position by the US, UK and 

India would strengthen efforts to resolve the impasse in 

Nepal. 

(From Wikileaks, released on Aug 30, 2011)