Democracy promotion strategy for Nepal, Carrots, Sticks Package to King

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY FOR NEPAL 

REF: SECSTATE 169895 

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 

Introduction:  URGENCY IN ADDRESSING DEMOCRACY AND MAOIST 

INSURGENCY IN NEPAL 

-------------------- 

¶1.  (C) Embassy Kathmandu welcomes the opportunity to 

respond to the Secretary's call for a strategic and 

systematic review of our democracy promotion efforts.  The 

situation in Nepal is fragile and deteriorating rapidly. 

The main impediment to the growth of democracy here is the 

violent Maoist insurgency, but the King's recent anti- 

democratic actions have increased the possibility that the 

Maoists will succeed in their goal of imposing totalitarian 

rule.  The King's February 1 seizure of power, followed by 

a number of measures which have further alienated Nepal's 

political parties from the Palace, have not only fueled a 

deepening constitutional crisis but also strengthened the 

hand of the Maoists.  The Maoists and political parties 

have begun talking about increasing their cooperation; the 

Parties are motivated to do so to increase pressure on the 

King toward compromise while the Maoists see an alliance 

with the Parties as a means to overthrow the King and a 

shortcut toward seizing power.  In the immediate term, our 

democracy efforts need to focus on encouraging the King to 

abandon his dangerous course of alienating the political 

parties and instead seek unity among Nepal's legitimate 

political forces.  Our strategy therefore includes a 

carrots and sticks package for King Gyanendra. In the 

longer term, efforts should focus on strengthening Nepal's 

fragile democratic institutions as well as on preventing a 

Maoist takeover.  While democratic institutions will be 

essential to a lasting solution to the insurgency, efforts 

to promote such institutions will be hampered by and must 

be designed against the backdrop of Maoist violence and 

extremist objectives. 

KEY ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY 

----------------------------------- 

High-Level Visit 

---------------- 

¶2.  (C) Given the urgency of the situation here, we should 

consider intensifying the pressure on the King to reach out 

to the political parties to seek agreement on a way 

forward.  We hope Gyanendra would be receptive to a tough 

love message accompanied by a package of carrots and 

sticks, especially if delivered by a high-level emissary. 

A presidential letter to the King could be instrumental in 

helping him save face and climb down.  The high-level visit 

also serves to provide high-media exposure of democratic 

themes. 

Carrots/Sticks Package 

---------------------- 

¶3. (C) We should offer the King a way out of the current 

impasse by letting him know the USG is prepared to offer a 

package of carrots if he does the right thing and sticks as 

consequences if he continues on his present course or takes 

even more repressive actions.  We should offer to 

establish a long-term relationship involving substantial 

development and security assistance as well as more 

intensive engagement on issues of mutual interest.  The 

package could be phased to reward progress on returning to 

democracy.  We believe that the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) 

may be an important lever to use to convince the King to 

alter course.  The King relies on the RNA for support, and 

is likely to heed his generals' advice.  Some in the RNA 

have started to question the King's course, and perhaps 

would be open to alternatives that would ensure the Army's 

institutional survival rather than following the King over 

an abyss.  In addition, we need to continually consider the 

importance of providing support to the RNA to enable it to 

effectively address the insurgency.  Should the insurgents 

begin to make significant military gains, we would need to 

be in a position to adjust our security assistance.  Given 

the rapidly deteriorating situation, it makes sense to 

include a robust security assistance package, which is tied 

to democracy benchmarks, as one of our carrots.  We should 

be prepared to present this tough love message to the King 

soon.  We are very concerned that by early to mid-November 

the situation here could get dramatically worse.  Daily 

protests numbering in the hundreds of thousands instead of 

tens of thousands would increase the potential for 

violence.  If the Maoists and the political parties forge a 

closer working relationship, the likelihood of violence 

escalates even further. 

Flexibility Given Uncertain Outcomes 

------------------------------------ 

¶4.  (S/NF) Our strategy also needs to be nuanced and 

flexible to react to evolving political events.  Given the 

uncertainties, we should be prepared to react to the 

various possible scenarios: The King reaches out to the 

political parties and the legitimate political 

forces unite on a way back to democracy and addressing the 

Maoist insurgency; The King takes more repressive moves, 

such as outlawing the political parties or declaring 

martial law, and the Maoists take advantage and make 

significant progress; or, The King allows the situation to 

continue deteriorating without taking further action.  We 

will need to be prepared to think about whether there are 

ways to ensure that the possible collapse of the Monarchy 

does not lend to large advances by the Maoists -- focusing 

on steps we can take to ensure a "soft landing." 

Work with Our International Partners 

------------------------------------ 

¶5. (S) Continuing to work with our international partners 

will be key to achieving our democracy goals.  We need to 

ensure we share our views and strategies and emphasize the 

same messages.  To effectively address the Maoist 

insurgency and restore democratic institutions, extreme 

caution will be necessary.  The Maoists are eager to use 

the King's missteps for their own end and we need to remind 

our partners that the Maoists' goal remains the seizure of 

all state power.  Although killings have decreased since 

the Maoists declared their September 3 three-month cease- 

fire, abductions and extortion continue unchecked.  We 

need to engage actively with India and Europe to make sure 

that they, and other external forces trying to get involved 

here, do not push the parties toward some sort of 

functional alliance with the Maoists. 

Needed: PD Strategy and Resources 

--------------------------------- 

¶6. (C) Washington and Post must fashion a clear and 

coordinated PD strategy to ensure U.S. policy to advance 

freedom, democracy, and human rights in Nepal is accurately 

grasped by media (national and international) and the 

broader Nepali public. 

¶7. (SBU) Embassy requests additional resources, 

specifically to create and fill a position in the 

Political/Economic Section and an Information Officer in 

the Public Affairs Section, in order to implement this 

strategy.  USAID is finalizing its triennial strategy for 

Nepal; its strategy has alternative proposals for funding 

levels.  To accomplish our democracy strategy effectively, 

Washington should consider funding at the highest 

levels allowing a number of proposed interventions that 

could bear immediate fruit.  End Introduction. 

KEY AREAS OF DEMOCRACY DEFICIT AND DESIRED OUTCOMES 

--------------------------------------------- ------ 

¶8. (C) Following are answers to specific questions raised 

in reftel: 

The ten-year Maoist insurgency poses considerable obstacles 

to Nepal making progress on democracy. The King's February 

1 actions were a significant setback to the nascent 

democracy in Nepal. 

-- The lack of a representative government at any level is 

a key democracy deficit.  The Maoist violent insurgency has 

prevented Nepal from holding elections since 1999 and makes 

the prospect of future elections questionable.  His 

Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) has proposed holding 

municipal elections by April 2006.  Thus far, the 

mainstream political parties have said they will not 

participate in these elections; the seven-party Alliance 

insists on the reinstatement of Parliament (dissolved in 

2002), a step the King opposes, citing the Supreme Court's 

decision that the dissolution was constitutional. 

Desired outcome: The Palace and the Parties agree on a way 

ahead on returning to democracy, be it elections, 

reinstatement of Parliament, appointment of an interim 

government, or some other arrangement. 

-- Elections are a critical element of democracy, as they 

are the only means to test the people's will and restore 

functioning democratic institutions. 

Desired Outcome: Free and fair elections. If the legitimate 

political forces (the Palace and the Parties) reach 

agreement, municipal elections could be held in a phased 

manner to address security concerns. 

-- Even though the King's popular support has declined 

steadily since July when he expanded his Cabinet and the 

Royal Commission for Corruption Control convicted former PM 

Deuba, public support for the political parties has not 

increased.  Currently, the political parties are focusing 

all their energy on organizing and participating in 

demonstrations against the King's rule rather than on a 

positive agenda. 

Desired outcome: The political parties become entities 

perceived by the public as viable to run the government. 

To do so, the Parties need to focus on internal reforms, 

including intra-party democracy, transparency and anti- 

corruption. 

-- Nepal's lack of institutions with legitimacy is a 

serious democracy deficit.  A strong and independent 

judiciary is sorely needed.  The Government continues to 

apply pressure on the courts, and corruption remains a 

serious problem.  The constitutionally-mandated Commission 

on the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) deserves 

strengthening and support. 

Desired outcome: A stronger, cleaner and more independent 

judiciary system capable of serving as a check on the 

executive branch and protecting the Constitution. 

-- There are growing challenges to media freedom.  HMGN has 

pressured media on several fronts -- e.g., publicly 

threatening unspecified measures against an English- 

language newspaper for an anti-monarchy editorial cartoon 

and seeking in court to prohibit private radio stations 

from broadcasting their own news reports. 

Desired Outcome:  Editors and broadcast media managers 

cover developments in Nepal with less hindrance and threat 

of government reprisals.  Media organizations strengthen 

their ability to provide independent coverage and 

commentary, and to safeguard media independence through 

legal and regulatory means. 

DIPLOMATIC AND PROGRAMMATIC STRATEGY 

------------------------------------ 

¶9. (C) As noted above, Nepal's political situation could 

deteriorate rapidly within the next two months.  We thus 

need to marshal a diplomatic effort to impress upon the 

King the risk his current course of action poses to Nepal. 

If the King and the political parties agree on a way back 

to democracy, the international community will need to be 

poised to provide additional assistance, possibly including 

election monitors.  In the event that, despite our best 

efforts, the King imposes more repressive measures, we will 

need to continue to work diplomatically to encourage the 

political parties to pursue a program that will permit a 

soft-landing -- a post-Monarchy future that does not allow 

the Maoists to take advantage of chaos to grab power. 

¶10.  (SBU) Post, through Public Affairs Section (PAS) media 

and cultural programs, USAID and Embassy activities, 

consistently promotes democracy and its benefits.  Ongoing 

efforts include: 

--Close coordination with India, UK and other international 

partners. 

-- Ambassador's public diplomacy efforts on democracy. 

Tied to political developments, PAS places newspaper op-eds 

by the Ambassador and/or other prominent USG officials. 

When appropriate, PAS arranges interviews with the 

Ambassador in important Nepali TV and print media.  The 

Ambassador delivers at least one major policy speech 

detailing U.S. views.  While promoting democratic 

developments, the Ambassador's PD interventions will 

consistently stress the Maoist threat and their goal of 

one-party authoritarian rule over Nepal. 

-- Engagement with political party representatives on plans 

to promote democracy. 

-- Strengthening institutional and individual capacity for 

good governance.  Such efforts encourage democratic ideals 

and help to establish the institutional foundations that 

will support free and fair elections and a restored 

parliamentary government. 

-- Improving the capability of the Election Commission to 

be ready for elections.  In the event of an improved climate 

for elections, the program would shift to direct support of 

the process. 

-- Reforming and strengthening the political parties. 

-- Undertaking activities to strengthen the permanent 

staff still associated with the dismissed Parliament and to 

support the anti-corruption elements of HMGN, such as the 

CIAA, Customs and Revenue Offices, and the Auditor general. 

-- Devoting significant resources to enhancing the 

judicial system, including training and commodities for the 

judiciary as well as alternative dispute resolution options 

to enhance public access to an efficient judicial system. 

-- Working with R to include mention of Nepal, where 

appropriate, in public statements on democracy and freedom 

by the Secretary and other top USG officials. 

-- Launching a series of digital videoconferences (DVCs) 

with prominent, expert USG and non-USG speakers on 

democracy in Nepal and the threat of the Maoist insurgency 

to Nepal's future.   On-the-record programs should receive 

good media play in Nepal, as did a recent DVC with former 

U.S. 

envoy Julia Chang Bloch.  Timing:  Every three-four weeks. 

-- Hosting at least three IIP speakers in Nepal on 

democracy-focused themes such as community media/radio, 

media regulation, journalism training, strategic 

communication for political parties, party organization 

(development, promotion, funding), etc. 

-- Continuing activities in support of HMGN's Peace 

Secretariat with the objective of enabling it to engage 

SIPDIS 

political 

actors in Nepal and serve as a forum to shape a peace process. 

-- Continuing support for the UN Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights. 

-- Educational and library programs related to democracy, 

such as book translations and Article Alert services.  Such 

IIP and library-generated products are frequently used by 

media and other high-level contacts. 

¶11.  (C) Additional specific proposed actions/events for 

the next six months: 

OCTOBER 

-- Dispatch Emissary with presidential letter and package 

of carrots and sticks. 

Possible Carrots 

     -- Offer to work with Congress to establish a long- 

term relationship with Nepal that would involve not only 

more military and development assistance but also an 

institutionalized engagement in various areas of 

mutual interest. 

     -- Offer to examine possibility of Nepal participating 

in the Millennium Challenge Account. 

     -- Support (and help garner international support) for 

Nepali participation in fora  such as the Community of 

Democracies. 

     -- Offer to work with Congress to substantially 

increase development assistance. 

     -- Offer to work with Congress to provide a robust 

security assistance package that would be phased and tied 

to progress on specific events.  Elements of such a package 

could include rifles, helicopters, training, night vision 

devices and communications equipment. 

Possible Sticks 

     -- Suspend senior U.S. visits to Nepal and oppose 

senior Nepalese visits to the U.S. 

     -- Formally suspend all military training (no more 

case-by-case review). 

     -- Suspend all, including non-lethal, military 

assistance. 

     -- Alert HMGN that we plan to increase public statements 

critical of the King. 

     -- Recall Ambassador Moriarty for consultations, and 

encourage India and the UK to recall their ambassadors 

as well. 

     -- Notify HMGN that we plan to support an Item 9 

resolution on Nepal at the 2006 UN Commission on Human 

Rights. 

NOVEMBER 

-- Organize and co-sponsor a conference on "Democracy, 

Nepal, and South Asia."  Guest speakers from the region, 

the United States, and perhaps third countries address 

democracy, civil liberties, civil-military relations, and 

internal conflict.  Invite a high-level speaker from the 

Department, such as U/S Burns, U/S Dobriansky or Deputy 

Secretary Zoellick, to open the conference either in person 

SIPDIS 

or via videoconference to ensure wide media attention.  The 

conference should draw media, academic, political, civil 

society, and government attention to issues of democracy in 

Nepal.  It would also highlight trends and strengths of 

democracy in South Asia and promote regional cooperation. 

-- Support Voice of America (VOA) staff to conduct an 

assessment of Nepal's media environment to determine how 

USG civilian broadcast agencies can best support 

democracy in Nepal, working with SA/PPD.  Possible outcomes 

are resumption of VOA Nepali service on radio (shortwave or 

FM); special democracy radio programming for Nepal produced 

by VOA; possible VOA-TV collaboration with private Nepali 

broadcasters; and subsequent VOA training for local 

journalists, especially community radio broadcasters. 

DECEMBER 

-- Organize a live (or videotaped) interview on Nepali TV 

via satellite with SecState to support/encourage democratic 

developments in Nepal, if warranted by developments. 

-- Provide study tours for lower court judges to provide 

them access to the international judicial community, from 

which they can learn modern jurisprudence and also find a 

community of support for judicial independence, which is 

lacking in Nepal. 

-- Consider training in the investigation and prosecution 

of financial crimes.  The skills to track the money in 

fraud or corruption cases are equally applicable in tracing 

terrorist connections; we should consider using counter- 

terrorism resources to finance such training. 

-- Conduct  a poll to survey attitudes of Nepalis on topics 

such as democracy, the monarchy, and other key topics. 

JANUARY 

-- Organize a SCP for five to seven IVLP participants from 

media, government, and legal sectors to  examine media 

regulation in a democracy, a key issue in Nepal in light of 

HMGN's efforts to suppress radio news broadcasts, limit 

freedom of expression, and enact new laws to restrict media 

ownership.  Participants would see that media regulation is 

not the same as censorship and that the United States has 

been able to balance freedom of speech with national 

security. 

-- Organize a TV Co-op with a private Nepali broadcaster on 

freedom of speech in America.  Co-op, aired on Nepali TV, 

would illustrate the vibrancy of political debate in 

America, drawing lessons for Nepal with its frequent 

political protests in Kathmandu. 

-- Conduct  an IVLP SCP for five-seven young political 

party leaders (translation required) to  stress the role of 

developing young political leaders.  Visitors would 

interact with American Council of Young Political Leaders 

and youth wings of Republican and Democrat parties.  If 

timed simultaneously with TV Co-op on freedom of speech 

(proposed above),  Co-op could include coverage of young 

political leaders interacting with U.S. counterparts, 

making Co-op production more attractive to 

Nepali broadcasters. 

FEBRUARY 

-- Collaborate with a prominent cultural institution to 

translate and perform an American play with a democracy 

theme. 

-- Organize an "individuals traveling together" IVLP for 

three to four Nepali participants, likely 

journalist/commentators and analysts, on civil-military 

relations in a democracy.  Program would stress the 

military's role in a democracy and the paramount role of 

civilian leaders in determining a nation's defense 

resources and defense strategy. 

-- Host American Film Festival with democracy theme. 

MAJOR NEEDS TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES 

------------------------------------ 

Personnel Resources 

------------------- 

¶12.  (SBU) The Embassy lacks the personnel resources needed 

to accomplish these objectives.  Post's 2006 MPP requested 

two additional positions to meet our current goals: a FSO- 

03 deputy for the Political/Economic Section and an FSO-03 

Information Officer.  Intensifying the promotion of 

democracy in a meaningful way will require these personnel. 

Post also requests that two positions we understand are 

currently programmed to be cut be reinstated as they are 

critical to meet both ongoing goals and new objectives - 

the Assistant Public Affairs Officer position and a 

Political/Economic Officer position.  These two entry level 

positions reflect one-half and one-third of each section 

respectively.  We would also highly benefit from an A/DATT. 

DIA is looking at a civilian A/DATT/Analyst position 

programmed for 07-08 but that strikes us as too long a 

delay. 

High-Level Visits 

----------------- 

¶13.  (C) The diplomatic and programmatic strategy above 

calls for several high-level visitors, to possibly include: 

PACOM Admiral Fallon, Dr. Kissinger, Deputy Secretary 

Zoellick, P U/S Burns and G U/S Dobriansky.  The presence 

of such high level officials in Nepal would highlight to 

the Nepali public the importance we place on democracy 

promotion, and provide an opportunity to effectively 

deliver our message to the King.  In addition to high level 

visits, we would ask for cooperation with SA/PPD, IIP, and 

R in securing public statements from and DVC availability 

by high-level State Department officers. 

Public Diplomacy Resources 

-------------------------- 

¶14.  (SBU) The November Democracy Conference will require 

about $50,000, not available in PAS's regular budget.  PAS 

also requests sufficient I-Bucks for IIP speakers and DVCs 

outlined above.  The Department already has provided FY05 

funding for the American theater and book translation 

projects, but PAS will require IIP assistance in gaining 

copyrights for the selected play and book, as well as for a 

potential film festival.  TV Co-ops and IVLP SCPs would 

require additional IIP and ECA funding.  A VOA staff visit 

and possible training would require limited funding, but a 

possible resulting initiative to launch a VOA Nepali radio 

service and/or special democracy programming on radio would 

require more expansive resources. 

USAID Resources 

--------------- 

¶15.  (SBU) USAID's new country strategy for Nepal to 

commence in 2006-2007 represents a shift in the development 

approach to heighten concentration on conflict mitigation 

and improvement of the democracy/governance climate.  While 

much of the strategy envisions longer term results, a 

number of proposed interventions could have an immediate 

impact and would be most effective if financed at the high- 

funding option of $60M/year.  The strategy is designed for 

maximum flexibility to respond to the fluidity of the 

political and security situations in Nepal.  A possible new 

program is Community Policing, which would repair 

relations between communities and governmental forces and 

encourage village solidarity. 

MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES 

--------------------------------------------- 

¶16.  (C) The King's February 1 takeover was a tremendous 

setback to our twin, inter-related goals in Nepal: 

restoring democratic institutions and preventing a Maoist 

takeover.  HMGN will likely continue to prevent the 

political parties and civil society from holding pro- 

democracy demonstrations in certain areas and towns.  The 

parties will probably remain focused on the King rather 

than trying to promote reform from within to make 

themselves a more viable alternative for the public.  HMGN 

may threaten or harass independent Nepali media 

organizations or individual journalists who cooperate with 

pro-democracy PD efforts.  The Ministry of Information and 

Communication may begin to restrict DVC programs by making 

ISDN lines unavailable.  (PAS has no alternative to Nepal 

Telecom ISDN lines at this time.)  HMGN may restrict travel 

of potential IVs, as happened with some activists who tried 

to leave the country during the State of Emergency. 

INTERNATIONALIZING DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS 

------------------------------------------ 

¶17.  (C) India, China, Great Britain, and the EU have 

influence in Nepal.  We should continue to coordinate 

closely with the international community, in particular 

India and the UK, on the steps outlined above.  The 

November Democracy Conference must take into account India 

and also the wariness of Nepalese audiences to 

messages/interference from India.  The conference could 

offer an opportunity for third country representatives to 

promote democratic development, softening possible "America 

only" perception of the event. 

PROBLEMATIC HMGN POLICY AREAS 

----------------------------- 

¶18.  (C) Currently, there are many problematic HMGN policy 

areas.  HMGN is considering pursuing municipal elections in 

April even if the political parties do not participate. 

The Government is currently pursuing a legal case to 

prevent private radio stations from collecting and 

broadcasting news.  The Ministry of Information and 

Communication frequently makes incorrect statements about 

media freedom in other countries in an effort to legitimize 

its crackdown on journalists, especially in radio sector. 

Media programs should include ministry representatives 

where possible, and they would be essential to the media- 

themed IVLP SCP.  We, along with the international 

community, are working with the Social Welfare Council as 

it drafts a Code of Conduct for NGOs and INGOs.  We have 

raised concerns that the draft Code could affect our 

development assistance as well as impose restrictions on 

the rights to association and expression. 

CONSEQUENCES OF PURSUING PROACTIVE REFORM AGENDA 

--------------------------------------------- --- 

¶19.  (C) HMGN has already started publicly decrying the 

influence of foreign support for the political parties as a 

destabilizing force.  An even more proactive USG role could 

intensify HMGN's displeasure with the U.S.  Government- 

owned media likely will promote resentment and criticize 

U.S. efforts as interference in Nepal's internal affairs. 

HMGN could distance itself from the USG and seek support 

from countries with whom we have no influence or with whom 

we disagree on a range of policy issues.  That said, 

pursuing the agenda could embolden the political parties to 

take the tough actions they need and undertake internal 

reform.  It could also provide the support they need to 

stand up to the King without forging an alliance with the 

Maoists.  Specific programs -- e.g., SCP on media 

regulation, (proposed) TV interview with SecState -- could 

concretely advance developments in Nepal, encouraging pro- 

democracy forces to continue and broaden their campaign to 

restore democratic government in Nepal and reject the 

Maoist goal of an authoritarian one-party state. 

(Source: From Wikileaks)