Full text of the Report of the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process - UNMIN

United Nations Security Council 23 December 2010


I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1939 (2010), by which the Council, following the request of the Government of Nepal and the recommendation of the Secretary-General, extended the current mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) for the last time, until 15 January 2011. UNMIN was established as a special political mission in 2007 with a mandate that includes the monitoring of the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), which is now the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M). The present report reviews the progress of the peace process and the implementation of the mandate of UNMIN since my last report to the Security Council, of 2 September 2010 (S/2010/453).


II. Progress of the peace process

2. Despite continued efforts, the parties have achieved only limited progress in advancing the peace process during the reporting period. Intensified, though sporadic, discussions have taken place, but the parties have yet to take a number of political decisions that would generate momentum in the main tasks of the peace process, namely, the future of the two armies and the promulgation of the Constitution. Some procedural decisions were reached relating to the establishment and functioning of the secretariat of the Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel, and a high-level task force was established to address contentious issues in the drafting of the constitution.

3. Most substantive progress has been stymied by the continued mistrust among the main political parties and the resulting impasse. At the centre of this is the unresolved issue of forming a new government following the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on 30 June 2010. Sixteen rounds of voting in the Legislature-Parliament have failed to produce a new prime minister. Options for power-sharing have been discussed by the  parties, so far inconclusively. Although the broad parameters of a potential understanding on the main outstanding issues can be discerned, the sequencing of implementation remains to be agreed upon.  4. The parties maintain that they seek consensus towards breaking the deadlock, but the movement away from their fixed positions has been difficult to achieve in practice. The Nepali Congress  has maintained its candidate for the premiership, Ram Chandra Poudel, despite 16 rounds of unsuccessful voting in the Constituent Assembly, of which he has been the sole contender in 9. UML has maintained its neutral stance in voting, and UCPN-M has voiced its opposition to Poudel’s candidacy, making it unlikely that he will  secure the necessary majority in the absence of a political settlement. 


5. An agreement by UCPN-M not to block submission by the Government of a

basic budget broke down on 19 November when the Government presented a full

budget and UCPN-M responded by physically manhandling the Minister of Finance

in the Legislature-Parliament. The Legislature-Parliament was subsequently

prorogued by the President on the recommendation of the caretaker Prime Minister,

and the budget was passed by ordinance. The opposition questioned the authority of

a caretaker government to involve the President in this matter. The suspension of the

Legislature-Parliament has also raised questions about the future voting for the

premiership and the implementation of the budget. On 12 December, UCPN-M,

along with some smaller parties, formally requested the President to summon the

House. In public pronouncements, the caretaker Prime Minister has indicated that

the House would be reconvened only after the political deadlock is resolved. 

6. In late September, at the first General Convention of the Nepali Congress since

2005, Sushil Koirala was elected party president, succeeding the late Girija Prasad

Koirala, following a close contest with former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba.

The UCPN-M Central Committee plenum concluded on 26 November with the

leadership presenting a united front, but reportedly without having settled

significant internal differences. The final document set the peace and constitutiondrafting processes as the party’s priority, while also speaking of preparations for a

people’s revolt” should this process fail. Significant numbers of Maoist army

personnel took part in the plenum despite UNMIN having termed this contrary to

the spirit of the peace agreements. 


7. UNMIN sought, but has yet to receive, clarification from the parties on the

scope of the unwritten “gentlemen’s agreement”, which reportedly addresses the

issue of the Nepal Army’s confinement  and the implementation of its national

responsibilities. The agreement thus carries implications for the monitoring of arms

and armies by UNMIN.


8. UNMIN has continued its efforts to ensure the Mission’s orderly withdrawal

on 15 January 2011, intensifying engagement with the relevant parties over the

integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel and on alternative

monitoring arrangements. The Mission has continued to urge the parties to address

the future of the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and

Armies and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee.


9. In line with the request of the Security Council, the Under-Secretary-General

for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, visited Nepal in October and again in

December to assess progress in the peace process. Meeting with a range of

interlocutors, he called on the parties urgently to reach the necessary political

agreements to resolve outstanding issues, primarily the integration and rehabilitation

of Maoist army personnel, ahead of the departure of UNMIN. S/2010/658


A. Drafting of the constitution

10. The high-level task force headed by UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal

has reached agreement on more than half of the 210 unresolved issues related to the

new constitution, most notably on the federal structure at the provincial level, the

use of official languages at the federal and provincial levels, citizenship and the

judiciary. Some issues of fundamental importance, such as forms of government and

the federal structure, remain unresolved. The parties have decided not to extend the

mandate of the task force, which expired on 11 December. 

11. The Constitutional Committee was unable to meet the 17 November deadline

for preparing a first draft of the constitution, contributing to concerns about meeting

the 28 May 2011 deadline for its promulgation. 

 B. Integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel

12. The Special Committee to supervise,  integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army

personnel formed a secretariat comprising the former members of the Technical

Committee, along with one representative from each of the security forces and from

the Maoist army. The Committee subsequently appointed a secretariat coordinator.

No decisions have been reached on the number, entry norms or modalities for

Maoist army personnel to be integrated into the security forces, or on support

packages for those choosing a rehabilitation option. 

13. At the request of the Special Committee, UNMIN provided data on verified

Maoist army personnel to the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. The secretariat

proposes to collect additional data and preferences for integration, rehabilitation, or

voluntary exit” with a cash package, through a survey of personnel in the


14. During the visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in early

December, the secretariat coordinator presented the outline of a six-week plan to

recruit and deploy liaison teams for all the cantonments, as well as to take over

monitoring responsibilities from UNMIN. The plan has not been developed in

detail, and has yet to be endorsed by UCPN-M. The Special Committee has also

stated that it could bring the Maoist army under its supervision within two weeks

after the necessary political decisions  have been taken and regroup personnel

according to their preferences for integration, rehabilitation or voluntary discharge

within a further 45 to 60 days. 


C. Other challenges facing the peace process

15. The security situation in the Tarai remains fragile, with continued reports of

killings and abductions by criminal and armed groups. Such incidents have mostly

targeted members of the business community and sometimes young children,

primarily for ransom. In one particularly  violent incident in early October, two

schoolboys were abducted and killed near Nepalgunj, leading to spontaneous

protests and sporadic clashes. Altercations between youth organizations affiliated to

political parties have led to serious injuries and a number of deaths.


16. A renewed emphasis on identity-based politics could raise tensions in the leadup to the promulgation of the new constitution. Madhesh-based parties have long

voiced frustration at their exclusion from the dialogue on formation of the

government. More recently they have resisted attempts by the Election Commission

to update voter lists by using citizenship cards. They claim that this basis for

registration would exclude more than 3 million Madheshi Nepali citizens. Other

small parties have expressed concern that using other forms of identification to

register voters will endanger national security by inadvertently granting the vote to

non-Nepalis. On 2 November, the Election Commission made amendments to its

registration guidelines, allowing certain documents other than the citizenship card to

be used for registration. On 25 November, the Supreme Court issued an interim stay

order, however, directing the Election Commission to stop registering voters with

documentation other than the citizenship card. 


III. Activities of the United Nations Mission in Nepal

 A. Arms monitoring

17. The Arms Monitoring Office continued to monitor the compliance of the Nepal

Army and the Maoist army with the Agreement on the Monitoring of the

Management of Arms and Armies, maintaining round-the-clock surveillance of the

Nepal Army weapons storage site and the weapons storage areas at the seven main

cantonment sites of the Maoist army. Arms monitors also visited the satellite

cantonment sites on a regular basis and conducted other operations using mobile


18. During the reporting period, the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee met

five times and considered 15 alleged violations. Three cases have been resolved, one

was dismissed, and 11 remain under investigation.

 B. Child protection

19. UNMIN continued to provide advisory support to the Office of the United

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations

Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) in the implementation of rehabilitation programmes for former Maoist

army personnel disqualified as minors, as well as to the United Nations mechanism

monitoring compliance by UCPN-M with the discharge action plan. The Mission

took the lead in organizing the visit to Nepal of the Security Council Working Group

on Children and Armed Conflict from 21 and 26 November, which was the first ever

field visit of the Group. Its members assessed the progress and challenges in the

protection of children affected by the conflict, with particular attention to the action

plan signed in December 2009 for the discharge of disqualified Maoist personnel.

 C. Political affairs

20. The Political Affairs Office continued to monitor, analyse and report on the

implications of the  overall political situation, including the dynamics among the

political parties, the role of traditionally marginalized groups and the proceedings of

the Constituent Assembly, and to assist Mission leadership in supporting the peace


 D. Public information

21. The Public Information and Translation Unit continued to monitor and engage

with the media, disseminating products related to the work of the Mission and

setting the record straight on a range of issues.

 E. Safety and security

22. The security situation remained relatively calm throughout the country,

notwithstanding incidents of extortion and the explosion of improvised explosive

devices carried out mostly by armed groups in the Tarai. There were no direct

threats made against United Nations staff or property during the reporting period.

 F. Mission support

23. The mission support component continued to support UNMIN activities

throughout the Mission area, and also prepared for the Mission’s withdrawal in

accordance with the approved liquidation plan. These activities are currently

focused on asset disposal and preplanning for the withdrawal of arms monitors from

cantonment sites. UNMIN also briefed embassies based in Kathmandu,

non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies on staff skills and

arranged a visit from the Department of Field Support to address issues of staff

placement. As at 29 November 2010, 254 of the authorized 278 personnel were

serving in the Mission. Out of 182 civilian personnel, 29.12 per cent are women. 

 IV. Human rights

24. No substantial progress was achieved in addressing impunity and ensuring

accountability for human rights violations committed during or after the conflict. In

September, UCPN-M suspended from its Central Committee a Maoist army

commander against whom arrest warrants had been issued for his alleged

involvement in the 2008 murder of businessman Ram Hari Shrestha as well as in the

illegal trade of a traditional medicinal commodity. The suspension is for a period of

three months, and it is unclear whether the commander retains his position within

the Maoist army. 

25. In contradiction to existing decisions of the Supreme Court and other lower

courts, there are calls in some political quarters for the investigation and prosecution

of cases of alleged human rights and international humanitarian law violations

committed during the conflict to await the  formation of the transitional justice

mechanisms envisioned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Bills for the

establishment of such mechanisms were registered at the Legislature-Parliament in

February 2010 but remain pending before the legislative committee, and in their

current form do not provide for prosecutorial powers or for a direct handover of

cases to the criminal justice system.


26. In September, OHCHR-Nepal released a summary of concerns entitled

“Investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings in the Terai”. The report

documents 39 incidents in the Terai which resulted in the deaths of 57 persons

between January 2008 and June 2010, all involving credible allegations of the

unlawful use of force by security forces.

27. As part of its agreement with the Government, OHCHR-Nepal will phase out

its regional offices by the end of the current year, but will continue to conduct field

activities across Nepal. 

 V. United Nations country team coordination 

28. Political uncertainties continued to  adversely affect Nepal’s development

operations. The 2011 budget was issued through an ordinance on 20 November,

more than four months late, and has yet to be endorsed by the LegislatureParliament. Significant delays and uncertainty surrounding its approval have

affected revenues, expenditure and investment projections.

29. Throughout the reporting period, UNDP provided ongoing support to the voter

registration process which reached approximately 1.3 million voters by the end of

2010 and is expected to reach more than 12 million voters by mid-2011. 

30. The United Nations Inter-agency  Rehabilitation Project, managed jointly by

UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund and the International Labour

Organization, continued to support the socio-economic rehabilitation of the 4,008

disqualified personnel verified as minors and late recruits who were discharged from

the Maoist army in February 2010. Of those disqualified, over 1,800 have received

counselling on their rehabilitation options, over 420 have completed their training,

and over 100 graduates of the programme have achieved gainful wage or selfemployment. The percentage of women in each category is 33, 27 and 40,


31. The United Nations mine action team continued to support the Government in

the areas of coordination, clearance, risk education, victim assistance and advocacy.

Currently, 33 of all 53 minefields have been cleared by the Nepal Army demining

teams with technical support from the  United Nations mine action team, and

clearance of the remaining 20 minefields commenced in October 2010.

32. Led by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, and in consultation with the

Government and local partners, Nepal’s development partners and the United

Nations country team formulated a peace and development strategy during the

course of 2010. Set to be launched in January 2011, the strategy provides a

framework for development partner support to the implementation of Nepal’s

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, seeks to improve impact and avoid the

duplication, gaps and missed opportunities commonly seen as risks to peacebuilding

efforts in transition situations. 

33. While highlighting the renewed focus on longer-term development, the

political deadlock leaves remaining needs and acute vulnerabilities unaddressed.

According to the World Food Programme, in 2010 the number of food insecure

people living in rural areas fluctuated between 3.2 and 3.5 million people —

representing approximately 16 per cent of the rural population, of whom 1.6 million

receive United Nations assistance. In addition, each year monsoon floods and landslides affect hundreds and at times tens of thousands of people. While the

Government has increased its capacity over the years, collaboration on building

preparedness and response capacity has  slowed. Increased sustainable medium to

long-term measures are needed to reduce vulnerability and resolve the need for

humanitarian assistance.


 VI. Observations 

34. Nepal’s peace process is at a crossroads. The journey that began a little over

five years ago with the signing of the Twelve-point Understanding in November

2005 was solidified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement a year later as well as

through subsequent agreements and constitutional, legislative and political

measures, has opened up the possibilities of substantial political and social reform.

The United Nations is proud to have contributed its share to this nationally owned

process in various ways. Not only did the United Nations deploy the Mission in

record time following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but it

also assisted the parties to negotiate the arms monitoring agreement that has served

as the basis for monitoring of the two armies and their arms as well as provided a

mechanism for dispute resolution and confidence-building. The United Nations also

provided considerable assistance to national authorities in conducting the historic

Constituent Assembly election. But Nepal’s journey towards sustainable peace is not

finished, and the prolonged political deadlock that has hampered progress has

become a growing concern for Nepalis and the international community alike as key

timelines and deadlines approach in the coming months. 

35. While the Government and the Maoists agreed in September 2010 that the

remaining tasks of the peace process would be largely completed by mid-January

2011, this has so far proved elusive. Although there have been intensified efforts,

including high-level talks in the first half of November, structured discussion has

been limited. The country has remained under a caretaker government for the past

six months with the parties unable to agree on the leadership and formation of a new

government. The peace process still faces several challenges, above all that of

promulgating a new constitution within the extended deadline of 28 May 2011 and

integrating into the security forces or rehabilitating roughly 19,000 Maoist army



36. A number of other commitments contained in the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement and the interim constitution have yet to be addressed and hold the seeds

of fresh confrontation if expectations remain unmet. Polarized relations and

deepening rifts among and within the political parties and the associated mistrust

remain at the heart of the stalemate. This polarization is not insurmountable. The

parties can and must find a way out of this  situation. They have in the past made

major compromises, and they must soon do the same. None of them can afford to

put the entire process and the fruits of their hard work at serious risk. No one side

can expect to win at the expense of others. 

37. Throughout 2010, the parties have demonstrated their ability to forge

agreement on some issues, most recently through the high-level task force on the

new constitution, and earlier in the year over extension of the Constituent Assembly

and the discharge of disqualified Maoist army personnel. There is still time for the

parties to fulfil their peace process  commitments and improve their political S/2010/658

8  10-69969

dynamic. Much depends on their ability and willingness to take fresh measures,

make necessary compromises and act on the acknowledged need for consensual

approaches. It is vital for all political parties to focus on the long-term interests of

the country and people of Nepal rather than on partisan interests. The successful

conclusion of the peace process is entirely dependent on the parties’ reaffirmation of

their collective responsibility and a concrete demonstration of their capacity to

compromise in the larger interest of the nation. 

38. Rapid steps are needed to secure the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist

army personnel in a mutually acceptable manner, which the United Nations would

have liked to see prior to the departure of UNMIN in order to avoid any vacuum.

There has similarly been no progress on the parallel commitment to determine the

right number and democratize the Nepal Army; as the parties recognized, this, too,

is vital for Nepal’s future stability. My Representative has sought clarity about the

status of the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies and the

Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee,  respectively the basis of the arms

monitoring arrangement and its critical dispute resolution mechanism. At this point,

however, the parties do not yet have an agreed plan for follow-on arrangements for

the monitoring of arms and armies. In the absence of broader political agreement,

this is cause for concern.

39. At the request of the Government of Nepal, the Security Council decided on

15 September 2010 that the present UNMIN mandate would be terminated on

15 January 2011. UNMIN was set up as a short-term mission. Its mandate of

supporting the electoral process and the monitoring of the management of arms and

armies were foreseen as transitional arrangements. In the absence of an agreement

on the future of Maoist army personnel, which must be arrived at through dialogue

and compromise, the monitoring mandate has been extended repeatedly, at the

request of the parties, for two and a half years after the successful Constituent

Assembly election. Beyond its monitoring role, UNMIN has been a positive factor

in the difficult context of the process during this period. However, it has had a

limited mandate that did not enable it to provide greater support in resolving

political difficulties in the peace process  as a whole. With the peace process still

incomplete and uncertain arrangements for supervision, integration and

rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, the optimal conditions for the departure of

UNMIN have not yet been attained. But at the same time, it has become quite clear

that it makes little sense to extend continually UNMIN without any meaningful

progress by the parties on political issues.

40. The United Nations has consistently emphasized Nepal’s sovereignty and

ownership of its own peace process. The United Nations will continue its longstanding support to the search for sustainable peace in Nepal, and I will follow

closely all developments in Nepal’s peace process and remain engaged, keeping the

Security Council informed as necessary. I am certain the Council will continue to

maintain an interest in the success of the peace process and would be ready to

respond to its needs, as required. The United Nations entities in Nepal will assist in

the rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel when the time comes, as well as

continue to lend support to the constitution-drafting process and the many medium-

and longer-term elements of peacebuilding. 

41. I am confident that the advances made in Nepal’s unique peace process will

not easily be reversed, and I urge all the parties to do their utmost to preserve these

gains, to complete the peace process successfully and ensure the country’s

democratic stability. Such processes are never easy, and Nepal has managed its own

peace process with greater goodwill and steadiness than have many other countries

in similar post-war settings. 

42. I wish to convey my appreciation to the members of the Security Council and

other Member States for their long-standing support to Nepal and to the work of the

United Nations in support of the peace process, and to thank my Representative,

Karin Landgren, her predecessors, her staff  and partner organizations in Nepal for

their dedicated efforts. (Source: UN News Center)

United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki moon report on UNMIN and Nepal peace process to UN Security Council on September 8, 2010

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented his report on Nepal’s peace process and UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)’s mandate at the Security Council on September 8, 2010.


Some observations: 28. Nepal’s peace process remains stalled, with few signs of a consensual way forward. The major parties are preoccupied by profound internal fissures and the question of power-sharing. While the extension of the Constituent Assembly by one year averted a grave political vacuum, over three months have passed without notable headway in the peace process.

29. UNMIN has continued to pursue the request of the Security Council to work with the parties to make arrangements for its departure. Interlocutors from all major parties have underlined, however, that they see no alternative to UNMIN monitoring at present. To help speed the creation of conditions that would enable the Mission to conclude its tasks, UNMIN has consistently and assiduously urged the parties to agree on measures that could be taken in the short term, and has made proposals to that end, ranging from steps to improve monitoring arrangements to strengthening preparedness for integration and rehabilitation. A non-paper prepared by UNMIN to stimulate discussion was leaked to the press, and its purpose misconstrued, leading to strong criticism of UNMIN for having exceeded its mandate, including, regrettably, from the highest levels of government.

30. Despite the sustained efforts of the United Nations Mission in Nepal, little progress has been made towards the conditions for its departure, as the continuing political stalemate has precluded the necessary cooperation among the parties. Six extensions of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal have taken place on the unfulfilled expectation, and the commitment of the Government, that the remaining key tasks of the peace process would be brought to a close. Those commitments have become unrealistic in the absence of a consensual approach. Following the resignation of the Prime Minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, at the end of June, I encouraged the parties to intensify efforts towards the formation of a consensus government, and at the time of writing this remains my hope.

31. It should be recalled that the original intention in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to address contentious issues through a consensus government comprising the two parties to the peace process. The Agreement was founded on parallel commitments, including the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army, to be resolved through the Special Committee, and an action plan established by the Council of Ministers for the democratization of the Nepal Army, determining its appropriate size, developing its national and inclusive character, and training it in the norms and values of democracy and human rights. UNMIN has repeatedly pressed for action on both points, before and after the Constituent Assembly elections, and has long warned of serious implications for the hard-won gains of the peace process if the future of the two armies were not addressed promptly.

32. It is the view of many that UNMIN contributes to maintaining continued calm and avoiding escalation through its presence and a successful arms monitoring and dispute resolution regime. On the other hand, its seemingly indefinite presence may be taken for granted, and the Mission is repeatedly made a scapegoat for matters which lie beyond its mandate. As I have stated before, the United Nations interest is to see UNMIN complete its mandated tasks and bring closure to its work in Nepal.

33. Since January 2010, the Council has acceded to two requests for four-month extensions of the Mission. I am not in favour of repeated extensions of the Mission’s mandate in an atmosphere of persistent and unfounded criticism that complicates its ability to function. These short extensions carry significant management difficulties for the Mission, while having had no discernible effect in expediting the political decisions required for the Mission to complete its work.

34. The present situation whereby Nepal is governed by a caretaker government and the main focus of the political parties is on government formation has not been conducive to sustained engagement over the future role of the Mission. Under these circumstances, I recommend that the current mandate of UNMIN be rolled over by the Council in order to permit the necessary discussions to take place with a duly formed government.

35. Should these discussions offer neither clarity over the role of the Mission nor any prospect of consensus among the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies regarding a realistic and time-bound fulfilment of their commitments concerning the armies and the phasing-out of UNMIN monitoring, then I will propose alternative measures to the Council, including the possible termination of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal.

36. I do not underestimate the challenge for the parties to implement the fundamental changes agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It is my firm view, however, that at this critical juncture of the peace process this challenge should be met through a consensual and negotiated process. To this end, I call on the parties to invest greater effort in serious and sustained political dialogue. The choice between continued inertia and a fresh momentum is in the hands of the national leadership. With the passage of time and the current political context adding to the risks inherent in breaches of past agreements, all parties should make scrupulous efforts to respect those agreements, with particular emphasis on commitments pertaining to the armed personnel of the Government and the Maoists.

37. I would like to convey my appreciation to the members of the Security Council and other Member States for their continued support to Nepal and to the work of the United Nations in support of Nepal’s peace process. I would also like to thank my Representative, Karin Landgren, and her staff, as well as partner organizations in Nepal, for their dedicated efforts.

(Source: UN News Center, New York)

UN Security Council Reprot on Nepal peace process December 2009


Expected Council Action • Key Recent Developments • Human Rights-Related Developments • Key Issues • Underlying Issues • Options • Council DynamicsUN Documents • Other SCR Reports on Nepal

ExpectedCouncil Action
In early January the Council is expected to consider a report of the Secretary-General on Nepal and to review progress made on the September agreement between the government of Nepal and the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M). The report is also expected to contain details of the arrangements being made for the post-UNMIN period.

Unless there is a joint request from the Nepalese parties, Council members appear ready to shut down UNMIN. Resolution 1939, adopted by the Council on 15 September 2010, renewed UNMIN until 15 January and agreed that UNMIN’s mandate would then be terminated.

At press time there was no indication of whether the parties in Nepal would ask for an extension. In the past such requests have been made at the very last moment. UNMIN, which was conceived as a “focused mission of limited duration,” has now been extended seven times since it was set up in January 2007.
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Key Recent Developments
B. Lynn Pascoe, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, made a two-day visit to
Nepal from 3 to 4 December 2010, during which he discussed the situation with the government, political parties, and the diplomatic community in Kathmandu. He also visited a Maoist cantonment in the Chitwan district. In a press conference in Kathmandu at the end of the visit, Pascoe stressed the importance of quickly resolving the closely related issues of integration and rehabilitation, power-sharing and the drafting of a new constitution.

On 9 December 2010, Pascoe briefed Council members in consultations. Council members agreed on remarks to the press in which they underlined the need for the Government of Nepal and all political parties to take advantage of the UN Mission in Nepal’s (UNMIN) remaining mandate and make compromises to ensure real progress.

Following a request from the Maoists, Nepal’s president agreed to convene a special session of parliament from 19 December 2010 in an attempt to break the deadlock over the election of a new prime minister. After six months and sixteen rounds of elections since Madhav Kumar Nepal resigned as prime minister, parliament has yet to elect a new prime minister.

In September 2010 the Nepalese Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants formed a secretariat to help with the implementation of its tasks. (On 30 November 2010 the Special Committee appointed a retired lieutenant general of the Nepal army, Balananda Sharma, as the coordinator of the secretariat.) On 16 December 2010 the Special Committee asked its secretariat to come up with a calendar for army integration and rehabilitation within the month.

The Council also had a briefing from Pascoe on 14 October 2010. He had visited Nepal from 6 to 7 October as requested by the Council in resolution  1939. He told Council members that although important steps had been taken, there had been no breakthrough. On 20 October 2010 the Council issued a press statement reiterating support for Nepal’s peace process and underlining the importance of the implementation of a clear work plan, including timetables and benchmarks, for the supervision, integration and rehabilitation of former combatants, as well as arrangements for the management of UNMIN’s residual tasks after 15 January.

On 15 December UNMIN wrote to both Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal and the Chairman of the UCPN-M encouraging all parties to reach an agreement on the reintegration of Maoist army personnel and encouraged the parties to expedite an agreement on monitoring and supervision of arms and armed personnel in the cantonments following UNMIN’s departure.

A Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict delegation led by Mexico, the chair of the Working Group, and made up of Council members from Austria, France, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US, visited Nepal from 22 to 26 November 2010. The delegation met with government ministers, UN officials, UCPN (Maoist) senior leaders, civil society representatives and children, and obtained commitments from the Government of Nepal and UCPN (Maoists) on moving forward with the rehabilitation and reintegration of conflict affected children.  This was the first mission undertaken by members of the Working Group. The chair of the Working Group briefed members of the Council on the visit to Nepal during the joint briefing from the chairs of Council subsidiary bodies on 20 December 2010.
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 Human Rights-Related Developments

Nepal will undergo its Universal Periodic Review in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on 25 January. The human rights situation in Nepal over the previous four years, which coincides with the end of the conflict in the country, will be reviewed. This review will provide an opportunity for the HRC to scrutinise Nepal's compliance with international human rights laws and standards. Submissions by stakeholders with concerns about Nepal’s human rights record have focused on the breakdown of the rule of law and of state institutions. Failures by Nepal's political parties to draft the constitution by the 28 May 2010 deadline, and to form a new government after the resignation of the prime minister on 30 June 2010 are seen as having delayed necessary political and institutional reforms, leaving the peace process in an increasingly vulnerable position. Moreover, these delays have resulted in human rights-related issues dropping down the political agenda. Of particular concern is the impact of these failures on the need to fill gaps in national legislation to ensure effective transitional justice and confront continuing impunity for grave human rights violations.

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Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether to terminate UNMIN’s mandate on 15 January.

Also a key issue is what the Council should do if there is a last-minute request from all parties for UNMIN to stay. There are concerns about the signal the Council would send if it chooses to shut down UNMIN in the face of a direct request to stay.

A closely connected issue is how the Council should react if a request to remain is made by just one of the parties.

Another significant issue is how UNMIN’s departure might affect the stability of the security situation in Nepal.

Also an issue is whether appropriate replacement monitoring arrangements can be agreed on before UNMIN leaves. One suggestion is that Nepalese ex-army personnel do the monitoring, but at press time there was no consensus on this.

Among the issues following UNMIN’s departure from Nepal is UN capacity for reporting on the situation to the Council and whether a Council decision is needed for this. A related issue is whether the Council should make a formal decision for regular reporting on Nepal from the Secretariat or indicate that this remains within the discretion of the Secretary-General. (Nepal will continue to be on the list of issues of which the Council is seized for the next three years at least. However, it will still require a decision from Council members to be placed on the programme of work or for it to be taken up as a formal agenda item.)

Underlying Issues
The government has not yet investigated those responsible for crimes committed during the ten-year conflict with the Maoists, such as extra-judicial killings, torture and enforced disappearances. Human rights groups have argued that continuing impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes is contributing to a breakdown in law and order in some parts of the country.
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The Council has the option of doing nothing, which would result in the end of UNMIN’s mandate and uncertainty about future reporting.

If there is a joint request from the parties to continue UNMIN, the Council has the following options:

choosing to leave nevertheless;

agreeing to renew the mandate for the requested length of time with no change to the mandate;

deciding on a technical rollover of one to two months; and

renewing the mandate, but with changes reflecting a new role for UNMIN.

Other options include:

requesting regular monitoring from the Secretary-General through a letter or in a presidential statement; and

requesting the Secretary-General to set up a reporting capacity to be located within the UN country team.

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Council Dynamics
Most Council members seem ready for UNMIN to leave after 15 January if that continues to be the position of the Nepalese parties. There is acknowledgement that a last-minute joint request from all the parties could change the situation and some uncertainty about how the Council should handle this. The
UK, US and France have become increasingly frustrated with UNMIN being unable to carry out its mandate properly and do not see much value in having it stay in Nepal. There is interest, however, from these countries in continuing to have regular briefings on the situation, particularly in the next six months leading up to the completion of the constitution.

Countries such as China, while open to UNMIN’s shutting down, have indicated it is also important not to ignore a joint request by all parties.

India will be on the Council in January, and most members expect it to be a key player on this issue. While India seems to have no objections to UNMIN’s departure from Nepal, it is less clear what its reactions would be to a request to stay or to proposals for capacity to ensure ongoing reporting. For most of the elected members Nepal is not a priority issue. Some members, however, are likely to be concerned with the consequences of UNMIN’s pulling out if the situation appears unstable or if there is a request from all parties to stay. 
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UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/1939  (15 September 2010) extended UNMIN until 15 January.

S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN.

Secretary-General’s Report

S/2010/453 (2 September 2010) on the implementation of resolution 1909.


SC/10062 (20 October 2010) was the press statement following Pascoe’s October briefing.

SC/10090 (22 November 2010) was from the chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict following the visit to Nepal.

S/PV.6398 (14 October 2010) was the most recent open meeting on Nepal.

S/PV.6385 (15 September 2010) was the record of the adoption of resolution 1939.

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Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Karin Landgren (Sweden)

UNMIN: Size and Composition

248, including about 72 arms monitors as of August 2010


23 January 2007 to 15 January 2011

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Useful Additional Sources

Indifference to Duty: Impunity for Crimes Committed in Nepal, Human Rights Watch and Advocacy Forum, December 2010

Note to the Media: Security Council urges compromise in Nepal as end of UN mission approaches, UNMIN, 9 December 2010

(Original post: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6453283/k.8803/January_2011brNepal.htm)

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